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Ariel Dempsey 
The Preference Wager:  
A Defense of Particular Religious Preference in an 
Age of Religious Pluralism 
 
“Some dogma, we are told, was credible in the twelfth century, but is not credible in the 
twentieth. You might as well say that a certain philosophy can be believed on Mondays, but 
cannot be believed on Tuesdays…What a man can believe depends upon his philosophy, not 
upon the clock or the century.” 
– G.K. Chesterton1 
Abstract: 
 
In the descriptive sense, “religious pluralism” merely refers to the fact that there is 
plurality of religions.  In the prescriptive philosophical sense, “religious pluralism” refers 
to a distinctive way of thinking about the diversity of religions. A pluralistic approach to 
the plurality of religions often argues that religions are morally and epistemically equal. 
As defined by Lesslie Newbigin, the ideology of religious pluralism is “the belief that the 
differences between the religions are not a matter of truth and falsehood but of different 
perceptions of the one truth.” Accepting the ideology of religious pluralism renders 
absurd any religious apologetic claim to a preference for a particular religion.  By 
religious preference I mean warrantedly preferring a specific religion as true, even in the 
face of a plurality of different religions.  The purpose of this thesis is to address the 
question of whether it is legitimate to make an apologetic attempt to argue for a specific 
religious preference and selects Christianity as a case study.  The proposal is that George 
Lindbeck’s Cultural Linguistic approach allows for a feasible religious preference and 
apologetics may have a role to play in justifying the preferentiality of a particular 
religion.   
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Gilbert Keith Chesterton, Orthodoxy  (Moody Publishers, 2013), 60. 
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Introduction: 
 
 
The last century has presented an increased intensity of encounter with the religious 
other.  As of 2010, a demographic study on the global religious landscape estimated  that the 
world consists of 2.2 billion Christians, 1.6 billion Muslims, 1 billion Hindus, 500 million 
Buddhists, 14 million Jews, 400 million people practicing various folk or traditional religions, 
and 58 million people belonging to the Baha’i faith, Jainism, Sikhism, Shintoism, Taoism, 
Tenrikyo, Wicca and Zoroastrianism.2  In this diverse landscape, engagement and interchange of 
worldviews has been amplified by globalization, technical advancements of modernization, and 
sweeping demographic changes from immigration.3 
The boundaries of where one religion4  begins and another ends are often indistinct and 
difficult to determine.  The historical relations were intermingled as religions budded from one 
another and overlapped geographically directly and indirectly.  Ideas and practices diffused as 
religions met and continue to meet.  Even within a single religion (such as Christianity) vast 
differences can be found between denominations, throughout time, between cultures, within a 
single city and between individual believers.  Religions are as diverse and integrally related as 
languages and dialects.   
                                                          
2 "The Global Religious Landscape." Pew Research Centers Religion Public Life Project RSS. N.p., n.d. Web. 30 Oct. 
2013. 
3
 Harold A. Netland, Encountering Religious Pluralism : The Challenge to Christian Faith & Mission  (Downers Grove, 
Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 9. 
4 “ A working definition is supplied by Clifford Geertz: (1) a system of symbols (2) which acts to establish powerful, 
pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men (3) by formulating conceptions of a general order of 
existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations 
seem uniquely realistic. 
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As a first order experience, religions seem to share much with regards to ritual practices, 
morality, social communities and religious/mystical experiences.  However at the level of 
second order reflection, religions make propositional assertions that seem contradictory and 
challenging to reconcile.  Among a diverse plurality of religions, the idea of one true church, one 
true faith or one true religion seems almost untenable and is ethnocentric, arrogant, or 
uninformed.  Confronted with the reality of religious pluralism (i.e. the mere fact of the number 
of quite different religions in our world), one wonders whether it is reasonable to hold the truth 
of one religion with precedence over all others and by doing so, make a claim of universal 
religious preference.5  By religious preference, I mean warrantedly6 preferring a specific 
confession of a traditional religion as true, even in the face of a plurality of different religions.  
The purpose of this thesis is to address the question of whether it is legitimate to make an 
apologetic7 attempt to argue for a particular religious preference and selects Christianity as a 
case study. 
This question is relevant because the way in which a person perceives their relationship 
with other religions determines the way in which they authentically encounter other religions.  
The approach to the plurality of religions influences engagement with other ideas and shapes 
                                                          
5 “Preference,” in one sense of the word, can be personal and subjective.  For example, a person may have a 
preference for chocolate ice cream over vanilla. However, notion of “preference” can also be used in a public and 
objective sense.  For example, one regiment of medical treatment may be preferable to another because it results 
in a higher frequency of cures, less remission, fewer bad side effects etc.  In this thesis, religious preference is 
argued to be more analogous to the latter than the former. (See Section 1: pages 1-3) 
6See Alvin Plantinga’s explanation of “warrant.”  
7
 The word “apologetics” comes from the Greek word ἀπολογία, which means "speaking in defense." The goal of 
Apologetics is to defend the plausibility of a position.  For example, within the Christian tradition, apologetics 
clarifies the Christian position in light of misunderstandings and misrepresentations, defends the soundness of the 
faith and vindicates its reasonableness by delving into philosophical theology, epistemology and demonstrating the 
coherence of the Christian thought.  Apologetics is a discipline that aspires to offer a rational basis and a creative 
presentation of belief.  
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the character and goal of apologetic discourse.  What should apologetics look like within a 
religiously plural setting?  Careful thought with regard to this issue is especially significant today 
when the religious other is not an abstract idea but our next door neighbor and part of the 
community in which we live. 
The past is littered with examples of counterproductive or disastrous reactions to 
religious diversity.  One can reflect upon the Christian crusades, Islamic terrorism, ghetto 
communities in India living in isolated indifference to one another and the intellectual 
reductionism of religions to “one common essence.”   Additionally, the question of how to 
understand and respond to the plurality of religions is of special significance to those of 
religious traditions that have historically made explicit claims of preference.  Some believers 
demand that traditionally orthodox doctrines need to be reinterpreted in light of religious 
pluralism.8  Does religious preference need to be abandoned as a thing of the past? 
Over three hundred years ago John Bunyan wrote on his Christian faith with respect to 
other religions that “everyone doth think his own religion rightest, both Jews, and Moors, and 
Pagans; and how if all our Faith and Christ, and Scriptures should be but a thinks-so-too?”9  The 
challenge to understand religious truth in the midst of a plurality of religions is not new.  Within 
the Christian tradition, one can trace the shifting discussion from the early church fathers10 to 
                                                          
8 For example, Paul Knitter explains away Jesus’ claims of uniqueness and exclusiveness by treating the gospel 
records as confessional, the incarnation as the mythical symbol of the nondualistic nature of all men, and the 
resurrection as a spiritual and psychological event merely within the minds of the disciples.  He attempts to justify 
the extensive changes by proposing that the “new kairos” demands a “new Christology” if Christianity is to remain 
socially relevant. (Paul F. Knitter, No Other Name?: A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes toward the World 
Religions, American Society of Missiology Series.No. 7 (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1985), 171-73, 84-88, 97-200.) 
9 John Bunyan, Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners  (1863), 97. 
10
 For instance Saint Augustine (354-430 AD) writes concerning the philosophy of Hellenic paganism, “If those who 
are called philosophers, especially the Platonists, have said things which are indeed true and are well 
accommodated to our faith, they should not be feared; rather, what they have said should be taken from them as 
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the 1893 Parliament of World Religions which occasioned the birth of formal interreligious 
dialogue and to the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), which formally declared the relation 
of the Catholic Church to Non-Christian Religions in the Nostra Aetate (1965).11  In the 1980’s, 
the discussion of religious pluralism intensified and the conversation continues in the twenty-
first century.  Contemporary philosopher of religion Alvin Plantinga writes,  
"To put [the problem of pluralism] in an internal and personal way, I find myself with 
religious beliefs, and religious beliefs that I realize aren't shared by nearly everyone else. 
What sort of impact should this awareness have on the beliefs I hold and the strength 
with which I hold them?  How should I thinking about the great religious diversity the 
world in fact displays?  Can I sensibly remain an adherent of just one of these religions, 
rejecting others?”12 
 
Historically, there have been roughly three standard approaches to the plurality of 
religions: exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism.13 
Exclusivism generally holds that one, true religion has access to God’s revelation and 
salvation. Other religions can be propositionally right, in so far as they agree with the 
exclusively true religion and are rejected as false wherever there is disagreement.14  A literary 
                                                                                                                                                                             
unjust possessors and converted to our use.” (On Christian Doctrine Augustine and On Christian Doctrine, "Trans. 
Dw Robertson, Jr," The Library of (1958): 75.) 
11
 Nostra Aetate was an authoritative document emerging from the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965).   Three 
thousand bishops from all over the world met and illuminated the understanding of Catholic doctrine.  With 
respect to other religions, Nostra Aetate affirmed the presence of goodness and truth in other religious traditions, 
the value of interreligious dialogue and the possibility of salvation of non-Christians, while also affirming Catholic 
doctrine as “the fullness of the truth.” ( eli-Matti K rkk inen, An Introduction to the Theology of Religions : 
Biblical, Historical, and Contemporary Perspectives  (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 111-15.) 
12 Alvin C. Plantinga, "Pluralism : A Defense of Religious Exclusivism," (1995), 188. 
13 The typology of these reactions to plurality--exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism--was coined by Alan Race in 
1982. Though prominent, it has been criticized for a number of reasons.  The categories function as a heuristic and 
represent positions on a spectrum rather than viewpoints of individuals.  These classifications also tend to conflate 
answers to different questions of revelation and salvation and the word exclusivism bears negative social 
connotations. (K rkk inen, An Introduction to the Theology of Religions : Biblical, Historical, and Contemporary 
Perspectives, 171-73; Robert B Stewart, Can Only One Religion Be True?: Paul Knitter and Harold Netland in 
Dialogue  (Fortress Press, 2013), 4.) 
14
 K rkk inen, An Introduction to the Theology of Religions : Biblical, Historical, and Contemporary Perspectives, 
166-68.  
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example of Christian exclusivism is Rev. Thwackum, the schoolmaster in Tom Jones, who says, 
“When I mention religion, I mean the Christian religion; and not only the Christian religion, but 
the Protestant religion; and not only the Protestant religion, but the Church of England.”15  
Another example of an exclusivist may be an Islamic exclusivist who holds that Islam is the only 
authentic religion, there is no God but Allah and Non-Muslims (Kafir) are destined to hell.16  
Inclusivism is similar to exclusivism except it is inclined to be more generous in 
acknowledging the revelation of God, religious truth, and salvation outside of the one, true 
religion.17 On the one hand, an inclusivist Hindu may maintain that Hinduism is true.  On the 
other hand, an inclusivist Hindu accepts, accommodates, and reinterprets other religions in 
terms of Hinduism: worshipping Christ becomes the anonymous worship of a Hindu deity.  
In contrast to inclusivism and exclusivism, pluralism is “an egalitarian and democratized 
perspective that maintains a rough parity among religions concerning religious truth.” 18  The 
phrase “religious pluralism” has a number of meanings.  In the descriptive sense, “religious 
pluralism” merely refers to the fact that there is plurality of religions.  In the prescriptive, 
philosophical sense, “religious pluralism” refers to a distinctive way of thinking about the 
diversity of religions.  For example, a pluralistic approach to multiplicity of religions may argue 
that all major religions are morally and epistemically equal.  The ideology of religious pluralism 
(as defined by Lesslie Newbigin) is “the belief that the difference between the religions are not 
a matter of truth and falsehood but of different perceptions of the one truth; that to speak of 
                                                          
15 Henry Fielding, "Tom Jones. 1749," Book XIII (1966): 133. 
16 Dr. Khalid Zaheer, "Religious Tolerance: An Islamic Perspective,"  
(http://khalidzaheer.com/essays/kzaheer/following%20islam/religious_tolerance_an_islamic_perspective.html). 
17
 Netland, Encountering Religious Pluralism : The Challenge to Christian Faith & Mission, 51-52. 
18
 Paul F Knitter, "Preface," in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions, ed. 
John Hick and Paul Knitter (Orbis Books, 1987), viii. 
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religious beliefs as true or false is inadmissible.  Religious belief is a private matter. Each of us is 
entitled to have--as we say--a faith of our own.”19 Religious belief fashions differently from 
individual to individual, and is a private “choice” for the religious consumer in the market of 
ideas. 
A conversation partner in this thesis is John Hick--one of the leading thinkers advocating 
religious pluralism.20  Hick was an influential English philosopher of religion and theologian.  
Though initially a conservative, exclusivist evangelical, Hick experienced a Copernican 
revolution of thought and became a self-proclaimed religious pluralist.  Hick attempts to 
understand the plurality of religions from a point of reference outside of any one religious 
tradition and accommodates the doctrines of Christianity to his metatheory of religions.21 
According to Hick, each religious experience is a culturally and historically conditioned 
interpretation of the same ineffable divine reality that Hick calls “The Real.”22  Invoking imagery 
of the Copernican revolution, he calls for “a shift from the dogma that Christianity is at the 
centre to the realisation that it is God who is at the centre, and that all the religions of mankind, 
including our own, serve and revolve around him.”23   
Another person contributing significantly to the discussion will be Lesslie Newbigin.   
Newbigin was a respected British missionary, apologist and theologian of the 20th century who 
falls loosely under the category of Christian inclusivism.  He was a missionary in India for forty 
                                                          
19 Lesslie Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society  (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1989), 14. 
20 Graham Adams, Christ and the Other: In Dialogue with Hick and Newbigin  (Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 27. 
21
 Netland, Encountering Religious Pluralism : The Challenge to Christian Faith & Mission, 159-77. 
22 Hick borrows a Kantian distinction in proposing that The Real is analogous to the noumena thing-in-itself and 
that each personae/impersonae manifestation is analogous to the phenomena experienced-as.  Hick also considers 
each religion to possess the same soteriological power to transform its saints from Self-Centeredness to Reality-
Centeredness.  
23
 John Hick, "The Copernican Revolution in Theology," Hick, John: God and the universe of faiths: essays in the 
philosophy of religion (1993): 130-31. 
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years, pastor in the United Reformed Church in the UK, a bishop of the church of South India, a 
general secretary of the International Missionary Council, and an associate general secretary of 
the World Council of Churches.24 His immersion in both the East and the West gave him unique 
insight into Western culture and the phenomena of religious pluralism.  Lesslie Newbigin 
represents a way of interpreting plurality from a point of reference within a tradition.  In 
contrast to Hick, Newbigin believes that the relation between Christianity and other religions “is 
pluralist in the sense of acknowledging the gracious work of God in the lives of all human beings 
but it rejects a pluralism which denies the uniqueness and decisiveness of what God has done in 
Jesus.”25  Newbigin describes the Bible as a universal history, Christ as the New Fact, and the 
Gospel as public, secular truth.26  In claiming finality for Christ, he claims that commitment to 
Him is the way in which we can become truly aligned to the ultimate end for which all things 
were made.27  
A third voice prominent in this thesis is that of George Lindbeck.  Lindbeck is a Lutheran 
theologian, medievalist expert and professor at Yale University who has engaged extensively in 
intrareligious, ecumenical dialogue.  He is a leading advocate of post-liberalism and most 
aligned with inclusivist convictions.28 His Cultural Linguistic approach to religious doctrine, 
which views religions as a kind of cultural/linguistic framework, is discussed at length in the 
upcoming chapters.   
Recently, the historical trend has been towards a more pluralistic understanding of the 
relation between Christianity and other religions. The spectrum has shifted from exclusivism to 
                                                          
24 "Lesslie Newbigin,"  http://www.eerdmans.com/Authors/?AuthorId=18402. 
25 Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society, 182. 
26
 Ibid., 222-34. 
27
 The Finality of Christ  (Richmond, Va.,: John Knox Press, 1969), 115.  
28 "George Lindbeck," Theopedia, http://www.theopedia.com/George_Lindbeck. 
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inclusivism to pluralism and some, such as Hick, 29 declare that pluralism is the inevitable 
conclusion. 30  Many people find the ideology of religious pluralism to be attractive.  To judge 
one religion superior to the others is regarded by many as arrogant, elitist, oppressive, or 
ignorant.  As Lesslie Newbigin writes, "for those who have shared in the multifaith, 
multicultural, multiracial world of today, it seems preposterous to maintain that in all the 
infinite pluralities and relativity of human affairs there should be an absolute against which 
everything else is to be measured.”31 What are the cultural and historical factors that make the 
ideology of religious pluralism appealing at this point in history to this culture? 
The culture in which this type of thinking has been encouraged is one typified by 
Individualism, distrust of authority, and the “supermarket mentality”.  It is haunted by guilt 
from Western imperialism and is shaped by its shared story found in the metanarrative of 
evolution.  These attitudes pervade our view of religion and make religious pluralism seem 
more intuitive while arguments for religious preference feel less convincing.  It is notable that a 
majority of the prominent pluralistic literature emerged in the 1970s and 1980’s.  Under the 
shadow of the Vietnam War, the Cold War, and Communism there was a general distrust of 
authority, encouragement of countercultural individualism and longing for world peace and 
harmony.32  Though ashamed of the imperialism and Western dominance evident in the 
                                                          
29 John Hick, "The Myth of Christian Uniqueness : Toward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions," in Faith Meets Faith 
Series (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1987), 23. 
30 In Introduction to Theology of Religions, Veli-Matti sketches the historical developments in Christian thought and 
challenges the model of progress evolution toward pluralistic Theology of Religions.  Many of the early church 
fathers possessed a limited openness toward other religions and the consolidation of the exclusive attitude didn’t 
happen until the 5th century under the influence of Augustine.  (K rkk inen, An Introduction to the Theology of 
Religions : Biblical, Historical, and Contemporary Perspectives, 64-68.)   
31
 Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society, 157. 
32
 Irene Taviss Thomson, "Individualism and Conformity in the 1950s Vs. The 1980s," Sociological Forum 7, no. 3 
(1992): 512. 
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Vietnam War, the 1970s and 1980s are remembered and praised for movements in 
decolonization, political correctness to protect minority groups, opposition to apartheid, and 
the advancement of women’s rights and gay rights.  America was proud of its capitalistic 
consumer culture and breakthroughs in genetics increased confidence in the story of evolution. 
The convergence of proud individualism, rebellion against authority, remorse for oppression, 
marketable availability of religions, belief in evolution, and yearning for global unity and peace 
produced fertile soil for the blossoming of pluralism.  Today the land is still arable for a fruitful 
crop. 
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Section One: 
Defense of Religious Preference 
 
 
To begin, it is important to clarify what is meant by “religious preference.”  The notion 
of preference can be personal and subjective.  I have a preference for chocolate ice cream over 
vanilla.  Preferring chocolate ice cream to vanilla is not making a universal declaration that 
chocolate ice cream is inherently superior to vanilla but merely that when given the choice 
between the two, I choose chocolate.  Sometimes, however, the notion of “preference,” can be 
used in a public and objective sense.  For example, one regiment of medical treatment may be 
preferable to another because it results in a higher frequency of cures, less remission, fewer 
bad side effects etc.  To take an extreme case, it is publically and objectively preferable to treat 
fever with modern medicine than with bloodletting leeches.33    
In this thesis, religious preference is understood in the public and objective sense.  By 
religious preference, I mean warrantedly preferring a specific confession of a traditional religion 
as true, even in the face of a plurality of different religions. I do not mean preferring a specific 
religion as one prefers ice cream (“I prefer chocolate ice cream over vanilla”).  Rather, the 
preferred religion is the one which merits my preference and affirmation in the existential 
commitment of faith: “We identify ourselves with [a particular set of religious practices], even 
                                                          
33 Historically, it was believed that poor health resulted from an imbalance of the four humors, blood, phlegm, 
black bile, yellow bile.  Draining blood by means of leeches and other methods was a standard medical procedure 
that attempted to restore the balance of the humors.  Allegedly, in the winter of 1799, George Washington 
developed fever and respiratory distress and died not from illness but from excessive blood lost in bloodletting.  
(MD Gerry Greenstone, "The History of Bloodletting,"  BCMedicalJournal 52, no. No. 1, 
http://www.bcmj.org/premise/history-bloodletting.) 
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perhaps define our own identity in terms of these beliefs and practices. They are what we live 
for and, perhaps, even die for.”34 
Let us explore what is, and what is not involved in making this claim for religious 
preference.  It may be helpful to consider holding a religion with preference as analogous to 
holding a scientific model with preference in the public, objective sense.  
 In the scientific community, it is said that the Wave-Particle Duality Model is “true” and 
that atoms act as both waves and particles.  While this model may be the best picture one has 
for atomic theory, it is by no means an exhaustively true picture.  The Wave-Particle Duality 
model is not a complete claim of what an atom ontologically is; instead it provides an 
illustration of a formula that enables us to speak truly about what has been observed in the 
world.  Though an atom cannot be fully reduced to just a particle and a wave, this model is 
preferable to J.J. Thompson’s Plum Pudding Model in which an atom is depicted as positively 
charged pudding with negative charges floating in it like raisins.  To say that one scientific 
theory is preferable to another is not to reduce the theory to a subjective fancy; it means that 
the Duality Model merits our preference over the Plum Pudding Model.  Atoms have behaved 
like both waves and particles for all people for all times for all places, regardless of the fact that 
the vast majority of the human species has not realized it.  To say that a theory is preferable is 
to say that, from what is known, the theory is able to explain the relevant data, express most 
truly what is observed, and empower scientists to make predictions and manipulate the natural 
                                                          
34
 Merold Westphal, "Existentialism and Religion " in The Cambridge Companion to Existentialism, ed. Steven 
Crowell (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 323. 
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world.  The theory and its formulas become the probe35 by which the scientist examines and 
has access to the natural world and the language in which they describe it.  36  Jeannine Fletcher 
draws a parallel:  
Thus, just as communities of scientists see the world in a particular way based on the 
paradigms they use, so too, religious communities see the world in a particular way 
based on the sacred texts that function as paradigms for them.  Believers see the world 
imaginatively through scriptural lenses, allowing the structure of their narratives 
themselves to organize the sensory stimuli of the world.  Within the pages of the sacred 
text are found the categories that shape religious person’s experiences of the world.37   
 
Analogously, a religion that is preferable, in the public and objective sense, enables us to 
speak, see, and act truly; it is a lens and a language38 for the believer.  The tradition expresses 
most truly what is, explains what is observed in the world, and empowers a person to live in a 
way aligned with that reality.  It is pragmatically true in the sense that it is in accordance with 
what is ontologically true.  However, religious preference is not a claim to possess absolute 
truth, but to be placed on a path that by following which we are led toward the truth.39 As Keith 
Ward lectures, “sensible [religious] beliefs are those that are not disconfirmed by experience, 
                                                          
35 Newbigin references an illustration used by Michael Polanyi.  As surgeon uses a probe to investigate a cavity that 
cannot be investigated directly so words so languages, concepts and stories are tools of culture for probing reality.  
The surgeon indwells and relies on the probe as an extension of himself and though tacitly aware of the pressure 
of the probe in his hand he is focally aware of what the probe shows of the patient’s body.  Analogously, the 
Christian community indwells and relies on the Christian story like a probe, tacitly aware of it as shaping the way 
we understand but focally attending to the world.  (As cited in Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society, 33-38.) 
36 As philosophers of science Phillip Kitcher and Gillian Barker explain this pragmatic approach to scientific models 
and progress, “the sciences march forward by finding or creating pockets of order, provid ing an expanding set of 
models that enable people to predict and intervene in ways that matter to them…Progress would then consist in 
achieving increasingly extensive or powerful models with respect to the tasks of predicting and intervening  that 
people take to be important, subject to the proviso that decisions about which tasks were important were 
informed by good judgment” (Gillian Barker and Philip Kitcher, Philosophy of Science: A New Introduction  (Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 102.) 
37 Jeannine Hill Fletcher, "As Long as We Wonder: Possibilities in the Impossibility of Interreligious Dialogue," 
Theological Studies 68, no. 3 (2007): 541. 
38 To say that religion is analogous to a language is not to identify it with a particular language.  Christians who are 
English, Chinese, Indian, Greek, and Russian etc. may speak in different tongues but, at the same time, share the 
same religious language of Christianity.      
39 Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society, 12. 
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that help us to make sense of the 'buzzing blooming confusion' of sense-experience, as William 
James called it, and that are useful to the conduct of life.”40 
The more ambitious task would be to rank religions.  Ranking a list of religions is made 
complex by the problem of culturally contingent criteria.  The question, “Which is the best 
religion?” is quickly followed by “Best religion for what?”  Buddhism may be superior to 
Christianity in its development of contemplation and meditation whereas Christianity may be 
superior to Buddhism in historicity.  The difficulty in ranking a list is that the order is 
determined by the criteria and criteria is chosen from within a culture heavily influenced by a 
predominate religion.  From the onset, it seems the outcome is predetermined by the starting 
point.  An inability to rank all religions does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of religious 
preference.  Religious preference suggests that one religion is privileged to come before others.  
In this context, “before” is not used to reference to a top to bottom ranking, rather “before” is 
used in the sense of a lens held before a pair of eyes.     
  To return to the original question: What might religious preference look like?   To hold 
a religion with preference allows its story to be the language that both probes the divine, and 
provides a set of lenses, not to look at, but to look through.41  
Is religious preference implausible?  The answer to this question may depend upon the 
plausibility structure from which one operates.  According to sociologist Peter Berger, 
plausibility structures are the “patterns of beliefs and practice accepted within a society,  which 
determine which beliefs are plausible to its members and which are not.”  What is considered 
                                                          
40 Keith Ward, “The Empiricist Turn”, lecture held at Gresham College, held on 14 February 2008. Lecture transcript 
found at www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/the-empiricist-turn/. (Keith Ward, The Empiricist Turn, 
(Gresham College, 2008).) 
41 Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society, 38. 
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reasonable is conditioned by the tradition from which it originates.  The notion of preference 
sketched above should seem implausible to those inhabiting a plausibility structure that thinks 
in terms of dualisms between fact and value, believing and knowing, and public and private. 42  
Though often left unquestioned, the axioms of this plausibility structure are not beyond 
criticism. 
The falling apart between the objective pole and subjective pole of knowing has 
produced the phenomena of being pluralists with respect to “values” (ex: ‘the chief end of man 
is to glorify God and enjoy him forever’) and not pluralist with respect to “facts” (ex: human life 
is the accidental result of the biological struggle for existence).  As Stephen Jay Gould writes 
concerning his ‘Non-Overlapping Magesteria’ model of science and religion: “The net of science 
covers the empirical universe: what is it made of (fact), and why does it work this way (theory). 
The net of religion extends over questions of moral meaning and value.”43  
A religion may be “true for you but not for me” but evolution is true for everyone.  To 
assert private values as public truth is considered arrogant, but it is not arrogant for a scientist 
to assert that evolution is a fact.  A religious belief is measured by sincerity but it would be 
ridiculous to judge belief in evolution by the sincerity of the scientist.  A person knows evolution 
and believes in a religion.  Religious preference challenges pervading dualisms by bringing 
together the subjective and objective poles of knowing.  Religious commitment is subjective in 
                                                          
42
 K rkk inen, An Introduction to the Theology of Religions : Biblical, Historical, and Contemporary Perspectives, 
248. 
43 Stephen Jay Gould, "Nonoverlapping Magisteria," Natural history 106, no. 2 (1997): 4. 
 
 
16 
 
the sense that it is a personal commitment, but it is also a commitment which has an objective 
reference point44 and claim of universal intent.45 
Newbigin traces the historical development of the dichotomy between private “values” 
and public “facts.”  He recounts the influence of the systematic skepticism program typified by 
Descartes’ methodological doubt, Kant’s critique of classical metaphysics, and Nietzsche’s 
deconstruction of truth claims.  This mentality was coupled with a universal application of the 
methodology of science that attempted to understand the cosmos as a reductionist machine 
and excluded purpose/final cause as a category of explanation.46  The dualism that emerged 
between private “values” and public “facts” is problematic.  There are not two avenues to 
understanding, one marked “objective knowledge” and the other marked “subjective  faith,” 
because there is no knowing without believing, and believing is inherent to knowing.47  It is not 
possible to reduce values to the subjective arena any more than it is possible to regard the 
arena of facts as free from subjectivity.48  Modernity’s empty promise of an Archimedean point 
outside the system and the possibility of knowing without risk are reincarnated in pluralist 
ideologies that attempt to step outside all religious traditions and evaluate them from an 
illusory place of neutrality.  Pluralism thereby proclaims itself to be exclusively true, and risks as 
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much in its commitment as does any single religion.  Plantinga writes concerning risk involved in 
commitment: 
“But couldn’t I be wrong?  Of course I could!  But I don’t avoid that risk by withholding all 
religious (philosophical or moral) beliefs: I can go wrong that way as well as any other, 
treating all religions or all philosophical thoughts or all moral views as on par.   Again 
there is no safe haven here, no way to avoid risk.”49 
 
Claims of religious preference face two major rebuttals.  The first objection is on moral 
grounds, and the second is on epistemic grounds.50   
Concerning the first, at the root of a number of different moral complaints against 
religious preference is the conviction that religious preference is arrogant and elitist.  Such an 
argument would claim that truth is larger and richer than could possibly be contained by one 
person, or one religious tradition.  When there are so many brilliant and moral people who 
believe differently, it is arrogant for a Christian to think they possess privileged access to the 
truth.51 As Chesterton writes: 
The one real objection to the Christian religion is simply that it is one religion. The world 
is a big place, full of very different kinds of people. Christianity (it may reasonably be 
said) is one thing confined to one kind of people; it began in Palestine, it has practically 
stopped with Europe. I was duly impressed with this argument in my youth…I found it 
was their daily taunt against Christianity that it was the light of one people and had left 
all others to die in the dark. But I also found that it was their special boast for themselves 
that science and progress [and pluralism] were the discovery of one people, and that all 
other peoples had died in the dark.52  
 
Reflect for a moment: how does the speaker for pluralism have the privileged access to 
the truth necessary to know that truth is so much greater than any particular affirmation or any 
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52
 Brackets added. (Gilbert K Chesterton, The Essential Gilbert K. Chesterton Vol. I: Non-Fiction  (Wilder 
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single religious tradition?53  Are there not many brilliant and moral people who believe 
differently than the pluralist?  Like the person holding a specific religion as preferable, the 
pluralist is still in the position of believing what many others do not, and nonetheless chooses 
to prefer pluralism.  Hick writes in Religious Pluralism and Absolute Claims that natural pride is 
behind doctrines implying superior access to the truth,54 yet in other works, such as An 
Interpretation of Religion, Hick proceeds to imply that he possesses a superior access to truth 
and proposes the meta-theory of religions which he holds as preferable and with universal 
intent.55 
Hick may go too far by assigning the word “ineffable” to God (and by doing so contradict 
himself,) but at the very least he acknowledges the gravity of God’s mystery.  Religious 
pluralists are right to stand in awe of God’s mystery but does the mystery of God explicitly 
imply that one cannot claim religious preference?  I agree that pictures of God should not be 
confused as necessarily being the real thing but this conviction does not exclude the possibility 
of propositional truth concerning God.  It does not follow from the ontology of God as beyond 
complete human comprehension that there can be no accurate human comprehension of God; 
(is God not powerful enough to reveal to humanity some truths concerning the divine life?)  
Scientists do not mistake the model of an atom for the reality of the atom itself, yet a scientist 
still maintains that there are true propositions accompanying that model.  Mystery is inherent 
to the subatomic world but this does not prevent scientists from humbly holding theories with 
preference.  It would be laughable if a scientist assumed all theories are equally valid merely on 
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the basis that our cognitive faculties are limited.  The language of a scientific theory is a tool 
that enables us to speak truly though, not exhaustively, about nature and align our actions 
according to her laws.  Analogously, the Christian language is a gift because it makes it possible 
to speak truly though, not exhaustively, about a transcendent God and align our actions 
according to his will.  
Hick raises another moral objection to religious preference.  In the Nonabsoluteness of 
Christianity he writes, “Historically, the assumption of Christian superiority has been destructive 
and used to motivate and validate imperialism.”56  There is a fear that political imperialism and 
destruction can arise from religious preference.  It is true that in the past, absolute claims of 
Christianity have been used for coercion and oppression; yet, in Christianity, the form that 
absolute truth took in Jesus Christ “was not that of dominance and imperial power but that  of 
one without power; whose power was made manifest in weakness and suffering” on the 
cross.57  Was St. Francis of Assisi imperialist in his affirmation of Roman Catholicism?  It is bold 
to claim that imperialism necessarily follows from religious preference.  
Furthermore, there is a sense in which religious pluralism can be guilty of a subtle form 
of cultural imperialism.  In reducing religions to a “common essence,” pluralists, such as Hick, 
look at religions through Western eyes and see a “pure” lowest common denominator.  
Abstract concepts such as “love” and “salvation” are divorced from the particular religious 
narratives that give them meaning, and are redefined by twenty-first century Western 
categories of thought in order to be incorporated into one, dominating metatheory of religions.  
Paul Knitter’s praxis orientated program for pluralism faces a similar situation.  If the abstract 
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 "The Myth of Christian Uniqueness : Toward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions," 17-20.  
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notion of “justice” is the core of all religions, the questions follow: Whose justice?  Whose 
peace program?  The norm by which all else is measured becomes the understanding of justice 
and a prescription for peace of the Zeitgeist which the pluralist happens to inhabit.58  Ironically, 
in his attempt to accommodate all religions, none are accommodated.  The religions are 
accepted only within the pluralistic system, rather than on their own terms and self-
understanding.59   How many Christians would recognize their own faith as it is reconstrued by 
Hicks account of myth and personae, Panikkar's Cosmotheandrism, or Knitters reformed 
Christology?  Though fear of imperialism may initially inspire pluralism, pluralism itself may be 
yet another form of the ideological dominance of one over many.  
Even if religious preference is not any more arrogant or ideologically imperialistic than 
pluralism, religious preference seems epistemically arbitrary.  A confident affirmation of 
religious preference is met by the response, “Why should I believe this rather than that?”  
Newbigin replies: 
“Why start with Jesus? Why not start somewhere else? We have to answer that no 
rational thought is possible except by starting with something which is already given in 
some human tradition of rational thought and discourse.  Our immediate answer may 
well be, Why not?...Every statement of ultimate belief is liable to be met by this criticism 
and of course, if it is indeed an ultimate belief, then it cannot be validated by something 
more ultimate.”60  
 
Hick calls attention to the fact that belief is generally geographically determined.  “In 
some ninety-nine percent of cases, the religion which an individual professes and to which he 
or she adheres, depends up on accidents of birth.  Someone born to Buddhist parents in 
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Thailand is very likely to be a Buddhist, someone born to Muslim parents in Saudi Arabia to be a 
Muslim, someone born to Christian parents in Mexico to be a Christian and so on.” 61  What 
follows from this sociological fact?  As Plantinga points out, “if the pluralist had been born in 
Madagascar or medieval France, he probably wouldn’t have been a pluralist.”62  If geographical 
coincidence casts doubt on religious preference, shouldn’t it also imply that belief in pluralism 
is a priori unjustified as an accident of birth?    
In respected works such as The Myth of Christian Uniqueness, it is said that modern 
historical and cultural consciousness requires us to abandon Christ's claim to uniqueness and 
recognize that all is culturally conditioned.63  Newbigin reminds us that “To a person living in 
another culture, it is not obvious that the modern historical consciousness of the twenty-first 
century Western intellectuals provides a vantage point that can displace the one provided by 
the Christian story or furnish a basis for human unity.”64  It should be noted that modern 
historical and cultural consciousness is culturally conditioned, yet it is permitted to make 
universal claims to be preferable.  Why is religious preference denied such freedom? 
The scandal of particularity65 is the belief that God communicated his purpose in history 
to some people, (not to all) through some events (not through all) and this memory is 
preserved and embodied in the Christian tradition and community.  In a chapter entitled, The 
Logic of Election,66 Newbigin contends that the scandal of particularity is inescapable because a 
rationality that supposedly leads to a true understanding of reality will necessarily be socially 
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embodied by a particular community with universal intent.  The particularity of the Christian 
church as one community among many human communities does not invalidate its universal 
claims any more than the particularity of the polis invalidates Aristotle and his philosophy.67 
An indian parable about an elephant illustrates a notion fundamental to this discussion.  
To summarize the allegory: a King brings an elephant before some blind wisemen.  One blind 
man feels the smooth tusks and proclaims that an elephant is like a spear while another 
wiseman grasps the tail and concludes that an elephant is a rope. A man leans against the side 
of the beast and concludes that it is a wall.  Holding the legs, the third blind man rebukes the 
other wisemen and informs them that an elephant is a tree.68  In the parable, the blind 
wisemen represent different religions attempting to make absolute claims based on a relative 
and limited experience of the same God. Each religion posesses a perspective on truth, but not 
truth in its entirety.  Newbigin makes some insightful observations:  
“In the famous story of the blind men and the elephant… the real point of the story is 
constantly overlooked.  The story is told from the point of view of the king…who is not 
blind but can see that the blind men are unable to grasp the full reality of the elephant 
and are only able to get hold of part of it.  The story is constantly told in order to 
neutralize the affirmations of the great religions, to suggest that they learn humility and 
recognize that none of them can have more than one aspect of the truth.  But, of course, 
the real point of the story is exactly the opposite.  If the king were also blind, there would 
be no story.  The story is told by the king, and it is the immensely arrogant claim of one 
who sees the full truth which all the world’s religions are only groping  after.  It embodies 
the claim to know the full reality which relativize all claims of the religions and 
philosophies.”69 
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Preference is inescapable if one is to take religion seriously.  If religious preference is 
dismissed because its claims are arrogant, ideologically imperialistic, culturally conditioned, 
epistemically arbitrary personal beliefs that may be “true for you but not for everyone”, then 
pluralism should be dismissed because its claims are arrogant, imperialistic, culturally 
conditioned, epistemically arbitrary personal beliefs that may be “true  for you but not for 
everyone.”  Religious pluralism is its own preferred view of religion.  Ultimately, religious 
preference is neither a moral nor epistemic failure, and something like it is wholly unavoidable 
given our human condition.70 
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Section Two: 
Foundations for Religious Preference 
 
 
Religion is a matter of both the heart and the head. 71  As a first order experience, it is 
behavioral and as a second order reflection, it is cognitive. In a behavioral sense, a religion is 
participation in unique community with specialized rituals, duties, morality, and culture.  In the 
cognitive sense, each religion is unique in its story of world and described order of reality.   
Upon second order reflection, each tradition provides its own particular answers to universal 
questions of life, death, morality, and meaning.72  In what sense can the second order 
reflections of religions be meaningfully compared?  Three models of religion--Cognitive 
Propositionalism, Experiential Expressive, and Cultural Linguistic73--offer different answers to 
this question and provide different foundations for religious preference.74   Strong and weak 
versions75  of religious preference arise from each respective model. 
As the name suggests, the model of Cognitive Propositionalism places an emphasis on 
the cognitive aspects of religion. As such, truth is a matter of ontological correspondence, and 
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various religions postulate contradictory propositions about reality that are either true or 
false.76   The Cognitive Propositional model is notably influenced by a rationalism that 
descended from Greek philosophy through the Cartesian program and Newtonian science.77   
Consequently, Cognitive Propositionalism advocates for a strong religious preference.  
According to this model, the preferable religion is that whose central propositions correspond 
(isomorph) to the ontological reality.  For example, in a debate with Paul Knitter, the 
Evangelical Harold Netland took a Cognitive Propositional approach and proposed that a 
religion be considered true “if and only if its defining beliefs are true,”78  and a propositional 
belief is true “if and only if what the statement says to be the case actually is the case.” 79   
Other religions are true in so far as they agree with the preferable religion and false where 
there is conflict or contradiction.  Though the preferable religion may be enriched with 
subordinate truths supplied by the inferior religious traditions, the temptation is to reduce 
interreligious exchange to proselytizing.80  Though it may be able to be adapted to a 
postmodern perspective, as a product of modernity, Cognitive Propositionalism offers a 
foundation for religious preference that may error on the side of being too strong. 
In a sense, the Experiential Expressive model is a sister of Cognitive Propositionalism 
because it, too, is the offspring of modernity.81   In contrast to Cognitive Propositionalism, 
Experiential Expressivism places emphasis on the behavioral, rather than on the cognitive 
aspects of religions.  The Experiential Expressive model understands religions to be symbolic 
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expressions of a common experience that transcends language and is manifested differently in 
different cultures.82   The assumption of Experiential Expressivism can be seen in the 
background of Hicks' thought.  Hick argues that the source of all religions is the ineffable “Real” 
that is experienced culturally and historically as the “personae/impersona” and is expressed in 
religious language that is at best a mythical symbol.83  Given the nature of the Experiential 
Expressive model, it is more difficult to make an argument for religious preference.  At most, 
Experiential Expressivism shows promise for a weak religious preference.  In this model, one 
religion could be considered preferable in the sense that it is the best expression, or superior 
depiction of reality.  Nevertheless, as George Lindbeck notes, “there is no intrinsic reason why 
there should not be many equal but distinct instances of the highest symbolic expression.” 84  
Arguing that one religion is the best expression may be as difficult as claiming that one painting 
is the most beautiful.  Different religions are appraised as complementary symbols that share a 
relationship of parity and mutual enrichment.  Unfortunately, the Experiential Expressive model 
comes at the price of compromising with a weak religious preference. 
An alternative perspective is suggested by the Cultural-Linguistic model.  As explained 
by Lindbeck, “A religion can be viewed as a kind of cultural/linguistic framework or medium 
that shapes the entirety of life and thought… It is not an array of beliefs about the true and the 
good (though it may involve these) or symbolism expressive of basic attitudes, feelings or 
sentiment (though these will be generated).   Rather, it is similar to an idiom that makes 
possible the description of realities, formulation of beliefs, and the experiencing of inner 
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attitudes, feelings and sentiments.”85   The metaphor of language is useful for balancing the 
cognitive and behavioral dimensions of religion. 86  Propositional beliefs are of substantial value 
because they comprise the vocabulary and grammar of the language.87  Experiential dimensions 
of religion are essential because they are the means by which the language is internalized and 
spoken.88  The Cultural Linguistic model is an inverse of the Experiential Expressive one.89   
Experiential Expressivism operates from “inner to outer”; that is to say, an inner experience is 
inadequately expressed with outward symbols and religions. Experience produces religion.  
Conversely, the Cultural Linguistic approach works from “outer to inner”—the outward 
religious tradition makes the particular inner experiences possible.  Religion produces 
experience.90  “There are thoughts we cannot think, sentiments we cannot have and realities 
we cannot perceive unless we learn to use the appropriate symbol systems.”91  For example, 
the language and symbols of mathematics makes possible a description of quantity that could 
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not be if we were limited to the language of music or poetry.  The relationship between the 
Cultural Linguistic and Cognitive Propositional model is less antithetical than that between 
Experiential Expressive and Cultural Linguistic.  Though antifoundational, the Cultural Linguistic 
scheme advocates a “careful realism” that does not exclude propositions or correspondence to 
an ontological reality but refuses to consider propositions in isolation from their social and 
linguistic context.92   
Does the Cultural Linguistic approach allow the possibility of religious preference?  If 
religious traditions are languages, how could one language be preferable to another?93  The 
religious preference suggested by the Cultural Linguistic model is both strong and weak 
because it is a preference that is based on categorical accuracy.  In other words, the preferable 
religion is that which enables us to speak, see, and act truly; it is the correct type of lens and the 
relevant type of language.94  Other religions are deemed neither true nor false but categorically 
improper in a way analogous to using the language of music to do calculus.95  At first glance, 
such a notion may seem insulting to other religions.  Yet, after taking a second look, it’s clear 
that the Cultural Linguistic model is more accommodating than supposed.  Under Cognitive 
Propositionalism, the non-preferential religions are false; according to Experiential 
Expressivism, non-preferential religions are inferior depictions; but within the Cultural Linguistic 
model, other religions are their own cultural linguistic systems within which God-willed 
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potentialities can be actualized and explored.96  Even if the preferable religion is categorically 
proper and can meaningfully reference God, it should possess an attitude of humility because it 
could be false in what it affirms about him.97  In this model, religious preference is strong 
because it is based on categorical accuracy and weak in so far as it neither guarantees nor 
excludes the possibility of propositional truth or error. 
A helpful metaphor is supplied by Lindbeck in The Nature of Doctrine to illustrate the 
notion of categorical accuracy.98  Imagine that a religion is like a map for a journey.  The 
“preferable” map is the map of the place you actually are at.99  If you are in Jerusalem, then the 
map which you hold before you is the map of Jerusalem and is therefore categorically accurate.  
Maps of New York or the Pacific Ocean are neither true nor false, but categorically improper.   
Most likely, the map you hold is not an exhaustively true picture of the landscape with precise 
proportions drawn to scale.  The quality and type of map may vary from a cartographer’s 
masterpiece to a sketch.  However, the map becomes true as it leads the traveler rightly.  In so 
far as the map is a propositional statement of how to get from one place to another, it becomes 
false as it is misread or misused.  The preference of the map is weak (like the preference of a 
religion) in that it is “capable of being rightly utilized in guiding thought, passions and action in 
a way that corresponds to ultimate reality, and of thus being ontologically (and propositionally) 
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true, but is not always and perhaps not even usually so employed.”100, 101 How true a map is 
depends on where it intends to lead one. 102  
Even though you may hold the map of Jerusalem, a person faithfully following the map 
of New York may be more similar to you than the person misusing their map of Jerusalem.  In 
the same way, a Christian monk and a Buddhist monk may share more than two Christians of 
the same faith.  Even if other religions are as categorically different as mathematics and poetry, 
religious adherents are united by a love for their respective tongue.  They enlighten and enrich 
one another in the way that a mathematical formula employed in a poetic text takes on a vastly 
different, though still significant meaning.103   
The Cultural Linguistic model stands as a promising foundation for religious preference 
that balances a tension between strong and weak preference.  On the one hand, religious 
preference is a strong claim to make because it suggests that the religion is categorical 
accurate.  On the other hand the religious preference is weak in so far as categorical accuracy 
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and Kitcher, Philosophy of Science: A New Introduction, 99-102.) 
103 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age, 49. 
 
 
31 
 
neither guarantees nor excludes the possibility of propositional truth or error.  A distinctively 
Christian preference allows the Christian tradition to shape the entirety of life and makes 
possible thoughts, sentiments, and experiences that (if rightly utilized) are capable of 
corresponding to ultimate, universal reality.  Christian doctrines become rules of language 
which make it possible to speak truthfully about God’s revelation of himself in Jesus Christ, see 
the true center of history in the story of the world and act in accordance to God’s will as the 
sign, agent, and foretaste of God’s Kingdom.104  Christianity challenges other accepted 
plausibility structures and gives rise to a new plausibility structure which is indwelled and 
embodied by a community of believers.  Holding Christianity with a Cultural Linguistic type of 
preference, Newbigin writes, “As a Christian I seek so to live within the biblical tradition, using 
its language as my language, its model as the models through which I make sense of 
experience, its story as the clue to my story, that I help to strengthen and carry forward this 
tradition of rationality.105   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
104
 “Center of history,” “story of the world,” and “sign, agent, foretaste” are phrases coined by Newbigin that I 
juxtaposed with Lindbeck. 
105 Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society, 65. 
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Section Three: 
Christian Case Study: Cultural Linguistic 
Approach Applied 
 
 
The concern of this section is a distinctively Christian preference proceeding from the 
Cultural Linguistic approach.  To consider a case study: how might a person understand and 
respond to the multiplicity of religions while making an argument for Christian preference? 
Such a question enters into the realm of theology of religions.  In the field of 
comparative theology, Francis Clooney is a leading scholar in the Sanskrit and Tamil traditions of 
Hinduism. 106  He is a Jesuit Roman Catholic priest, professor at Harvard Divinity School whose 
work is in accord with the Lindbeck’s Cultural Linguistic model.107  In his essay, “Reading the 
World in Christ: From Comparison to Inclusivism”, Clooney is representative of Lindbeck when 
he writes, “The whole of the world is the locus of the story of God’s universal saving action, and 
yet…the Bible is the privileged, particular language of this salvation and understanding.”108     
According to Clooney, the Bible defines the world in which the texts of other religions 
are written and the framework through which they are interpreted.  The adherents of other 
religious traditions are within the Biblical world and their texts are part of the context of the 
                                                          
106 "Francis Xavier Clooney," President and Fellows of Harvard College, 
http://www.hds.harvard.edu/people/faculty/francis-x-clooney-sj. 
107 Christopher Denny, "Interreligious Reading and Self-Definition for Raimon Panikkar and Francis Clooney," 
Journal of Ecumenical Studies 44, no. 3 (2009): 423. 
108
 Emphasis in original.  Francis X Clooney, "Reading the World in Christ: From Comparison to Inclusivism," 
Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: The Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of Religions (1990): 67.  
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Bible that must be “read” into the Christian horizon.109  All reality, including other religions, is 
redescribed in light of a biblical interpretive framework.110  With regard to Hindu scripture he 
writes:  
 
“What becomes of religious other: We can welcome this new arrival and can do so 
without prejudice to our Christian beliefs, without having to choose between reading this 
song and our accustomed, faithful reading of the Bible.  For we can read this song in the 
context of the Bible, as new context for it, and without forgetting that it will always be 
the Bible which gives shape to the Christian's world.  But if readers read with openness, 
they will find that their reading of the Bible is transformed, and that [Tiruväymoji 10 3] is 
a new, important addition to the set of texts which are the Bible's context Nämmajvär's 
song begins to echo gently in all our reading, as its images and powerful, plaintive cries 
intrude ever so quietly—or dramatically.111 
 
While Lindbeck and Clooney are both inclusivist advocates of the Cultural Linguistic 
model, it is important to avoid conflation of the two theologians.  Lindbeck emphasizes the 
independence of religious traditions and significance of intrareligious dialogue; Clooney gives 
prominence to the interdependence112 of religious traditions and imperative of interreligious 
dialogue.113  According to Clooney, the aim of interreligious comparison is “to subject the 
[Christian] tradition to the slow, subtle molding of the theological artifacts of the other 
                                                          
109
 Clooney elaborates in Reading the World in Christ: From Comparison to Inclusivism: “[l]f we remember that the 
Bible defines the world in which these other texts are written, heard, and read, then we must read these religions 
...and their texts as part of its context [T]his biblical starting point dismisses the idea that there is anything 
"outside" Christianity. If the Bible constitutes the world, this is a world which has no outside, no place beyond it. . . 
. [T]he non-Christian is already within the Christian, biblical world; the Christian has to "read" the non-Christian 
within the Christian horizon.” (ibid., 68.) 
110 The Christian community is a living hermeneutic of the gospel and there is a dialectical relationship between the 
tradition and new experience of the community.  As a living tradition, the community concurrently interprets the 
Christian tradition in light of new experience and understands new experiences in light of the Biblical message. 
(Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society, 63-65.) 
111 Francis X Clooney, "When the Religions Become Context," Theology Today 47, no. 1 (1990): 35.   
112 Though maintaining a theological interdependence between religions, Clooney also acknowledges 
independence.   
113
 David Cheetham and Ulrich Winkler, Interreligious Hermeneutics in Pluralistic Europe: Between Texts and 
People, vol. 40 (Rodopi, 2011), 167. 
 
 
34 
 
religion”114  He cautiously maintains the tension between adhering to the universal claim of 
Christianity and seeking the transformative power of truth beyond the boundary of the 
Christian community.   
The Cultural Linguistic approach propounded by Clooney and Lindbeck preserves the 
otherness115 of each religion’s unique categories of thought and language and does not submit 
religious self-understanding to pluralistic reduction.  Lindbeck goes so far as to say that religions 
may in fact “be incommensurable in such a way that no equivalents can be found in one 
language or religion for the crucial terms of the other.”116  He further comments, “Buddhist 
compassion, Christian love, French revolution fraternité are not the same fundamental human 
awareness but radically different ways of orientating one toward the self, neighbor, and 
cosmos.”117 The symbols of one religion are not easily translatable into another because the 
symbols are embedded within the narrative life of the community.  There is no one to one 
correspondence in which, for example, Kali (the Hindu feminine embodiment of the divine) 
could be substituted with the Virgin Mary.118  Thomas Merton would concur: “You can hardly 
set Christianity and Zen side by side and compare.  It is like trying to compare mathematics and 
tennis.”119     
A difficulty emerges from the Cultural Linguistic approach to Christian preference.  It is a 
formidable task to justify that the one religious “language,” say Christianity, is the language in 
                                                          
114 Robert C Neville, The Truth of Broken Symbols  (SUNY Press, 1996), 263. 
115 Lindbeck argues that in a search for similarities between religions, one must not be blinded to the particular.  
Two languages are not alike merely because they have overlapping sounds or referents.  And to say that all 
religions are love is as banal as saying that all languages are spoken. (Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion 
and Theology in a Postliberal Age, 41-42.)  
116 Ibid., 48. 
117
 Ibid., 40.  
118
 Fletcher, "As Long as We Wonder: Possibilities in the Impossibility of Interreligious Dialogue," 544. 
119 Thomas Merton, Zen and the Birds of Appetite  (New Directions Publishing, 1968), 30.  
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which, “everything can be properly construed and out outside of which nothing can be equally 
well understood.”120  An additional level of complexity is added by the notion of 
incommensurability.  Apologetics121 is a discipline that aspires to offer a rational basis for a 
belief and defend its plausibility.  The incommensurability preserving otherness does not does 
not seem amenable to apologetic arguments for preference.  Consequently, the choice of which 
religion is preferential seems to be a purely fidiest matter of arbitrary whim or blind faith.   
  This is the problem:  If religions cannot be conceptually translated without being 
divorced from the “language game”122 that gives them meaning, then religious traditions seem 
fated to remain isolated ghettos and genuine apologetic discourse absurd.  Does 
incommensurability feasibly allow for the practice of apologetics?  To begin with, it is important 
to note that Lindbeck does not conclude from the notion of incommensurability that a person is 
unable to communicate interreligiously or understand a position different from one’s own.  
Instead Lindbeck uses incommensurability to argue for the rejection of a formulated 
Archimedean point123 of neutral, universal principles and standards.124  Drawing from 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz, Lindbeck argues that if one wishes to understand fully the 
language of a community, one must be immersed in the culture of its community, life and 
                                                          
120
 Quoting Lindbeck in George Lindbeck, "The Gospel’s Uniqueness: Election and Untranslatability," Modern 
Theology 13, no. 4 (1997): 430. 
121 The word “apologetics” is derived from the Greek word ἀπολογία, which means "speaking in defense." The goal 
of Apologetics is to defend the plausibility of a position.  For example, within the Christian tradition, Apologetics 
clarifies the Christian position in light of misunderstandings and misrepresentations, defends the soundness of the 
faith and vindicates its reasonableness by delving into philosophical theology, epistemology and demonstrating the 
coherence of the Christian thought.  Apologetics is a discipline that aspires to offer a rational basis and a creative 
presentation of belief.  
122 Fletcher, "As Long as We Wonder: Possibilities in the Impossibility of Interreligious Dialogue," 536. 
123 Newbigin also doubts whether the modern historical consciousness of the twenty-first century Western 
intellectual can provide an Archimedean starting point and reveal dualisms between fact and value; knower and 
object known; and public and private that pervade its plausibility structure.  
124
 David G. Kamitsuka, "The Justification of Religious Belief in the Pluralistic Public Realm: Another Look at 
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practices.125  This perspective does not exclude the possibility of partially grasping another 
tradition.  Even if religious concepts cannot be “translated without remainder;” there is a 
portion, (albeit limited) that is successfully translated. 126  Alternatively, a person may be 
religiously “bilingual.”127 Just as an American may speak German without being a citizen of 
Germany; Francis Clooney was versed in Hindu tradition, yet still a committed Christian.  In 
contemplating incommensurability with regards to the Cultural Linguistic model, one can draw 
from the metaphor of language: there is no universal language, yet the Chinese woman and 
Indian man immersed within their respective cultures may still communicate if they both speak 
English.  Drawing from the metaphor of culture: there is no universally shared culture yet, the 
Chinese and Indian chemists comprehend and share each other’s chemical equations even 
though they each understand and experience what chemistry and science is, through the 
nuanced lens of their respective cultures. 
Recall that incommensurability is not a problem unique to religion.  Different scientific 
paradigms are arguably incommensurable (especially with regard to problems entailed and 
standards applied)128 but this does not necessarily make impossible apologetics between 
different schools of thought.  If Galileo were to debate with Ptolemy, they would both be 
beginning from different assumptions about the universe, methods of conducting experiments, 
and overall worldviews; yet, they could still compare how their models make sense of the data 
they might have in common by virtue of both being astronomers.  A Christian and a Hindu from 
incommensurable worldviews could still converse apologetically since both would be 
                                                          
125 Fletcher, "As Long as We Wonder: Possibilities in the Impossibility of Interreligious Dialogue," 538. 
126 William Werpehowski, "Ad Hoc Apologetics," The Journal of religion (1986): 284. 
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 Lindbeck, "The Gospel’s Uniqueness: Election and Untranslatability," 427.  
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comparing their models (texts, histories, thinkers, personal testimonies) of how they made 
sense of the data of the shared experience in virtue of both being religious human beings. 
Assuming the possibility of religious preference and apologetics under the Cultural 
Linguistic approach, the challenge for the apologist is to say that this religion is the one to be 
preferred.   A form of apologetics less compatible with the Cultural Linguistic scheme is one 
which domesticates the religion within an extraneous plausibility structure and articulates the 
faith in the language of a foreign context.  Such a systematic apologetic attempts to justify a 
religion in terms of contemporary questions and frameworks and appeal to universal principles 
and structures.129   
An apologetic harmonious with the Cultural Linguistic model is one which reverses the 
direction of domestication and interprets the contemporary perspective within the religious 
narrative and language.  In accordance with antifoundationalism, the Cultural Linguistic scheme 
accepts that “all reasoning and knowing takes place within particular epistemic contexts, in 
relation to specific traditions, systems of belief, meaning values, particular social practices and 
the complex networks of assumptions embedded within the linguistic habits of any particular 
culture.”130  For this reason, the Cultural Linguistic apologetic relinquishes the notion of 
universally shared human experience or reason and does not attempt to justify an ultimate 
religious commitment by appealing to some theory of knowledge or experience more 
ultimate.131  Writing from within the Christian tradition, Newbigin explicates:  
“The Christian believer is using the same faculty of reason as his unbelieving neighbor 
and he is using it in dealing with the same realities, which are those with which every 
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130
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human being has to deal.  But he is seeing them in a new light, in a new perspective.  
They fall for him in a different pattern.  He cannot justify the new patter in terms of the 
old; he can only say to his unbelieving neighbor, stand here with me and see if you don’t 
see the same pattern as I do.”132 
 
Under the Cultural Linguistic model the favorable apologetic strategy is, an ad hoc133 
apologetic that addresses specific audiences from particular social, cultural and historical 
backgrounds is favorable.  A contextually based shared rational space,134 rather than universally 
accepted principles, becomes the point of apologetic discourse between interlocutors.135  
Lindbeck argues that though religions are not subject to absolute proof or disproof, they can 
nevertheless be tested in a way not wholly unlike general scientific theories or paradigms.  Just 
as a scientific paradigm is affirmed in the face of other theories and tested on basis of its power 
to successfully or unsuccessfully explains the shared data, so too a religion is judged by its 
assimilative power. 136  Ad hoc apologetics is holistic and somewhat coherentist; as it stands in 
the background, ad hoc apologetics endeavors to present the Christian web of beliefs as a 
coherent whole, buttressed by epistemological, philosophical, historical, scientific, 
sociopolitical, anthropological, and theological apologetic arguments, pragmatic considerations 
and its ultimate assimilative power.137  Religious truth claims are not vindicated by appeal to 
external standards of rationality but “an interpretation of human history and the world from 
the perspective of the Christian faith provides an intelligible and persuasive explanation of the 
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 Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society, 11. 
133 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age, 131. 
134 Werpehowski, "Ad Hoc Apologetics," 589. 
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aspects of human life shared in a particular context.138  Admittedly, ad hoc apologetics alone is 
not the focal point in choosing a religious tradition but does give warrant to taking 
reasonableness139 in religion seriously.140    
 Individuals from different religious traditions may reasonably consider each other to 
be wrong on certain factual points (ex: “Is God or Brahma, as the source of al l contingent 
reality, ultimately personal or impersonal?”).  In the regard to the case study, the Christian 
apologist can discuss religious similarities and differences while affirming Christianity is true;  
and if there is a basic point of contradiction between two different views, the Christian can still 
believe she is right and the other is wrong and yet respect the other as being rational in their 
beliefs.  Such an attitude can be adapted from William Rowe’s notion of “The Friendly 
Atheist”141 and formatted into “The Friendly Christian.”  Suppose a Muslim asserts that 
historically, Jesus did not die by crucifixion.  The Christian can accept that the person 
contradicting core Christian doctrine, though wrong, may still be rationally justified in that 
holding that view.  Rowe gives the following analogy: 
“Suppose your friends see you off on a flight to Hawaii. Hours after take-off they learn 
that your plane has gone down at sea. After a twenty-four hour search, no survivors 
have been found. Under these circumstances they are rationally justified in believing that 
you have perished. But it is hardly rational for you to believe this, as you bob up and 
down in your life vest, wondering why the search planes have failed to spot you. Indeed, 
to amuse yourself while awaiting your fate, you might very well reflect on the fact that 
your friends are rationally justified in believing that you are now dead, a proposition you 
disbelieve and are rationally justified in disbelieving.”142  
 
                                                          
138 Crane, "Postliberals, Truth, Ad Hoc Apologetics, and (Something Like) General Revelation," 41.  
139 As Thomas Kuhn points out with respect to science, reasonableness has something of an aesthetic quality. 
140 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age, 131. 
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 William L Rowe, "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," American Philosophical Quarterly (1979): 
340-41. 
142 Ibid., 340. 
 
 
40 
 
So too a Christian may be rationally justified in her Christian preference and yet hold 
that some other religious theists “are rationally justified in believing just the opposite of what 
[she] believes."143  
It seems appropriate to capture the character of Christian preference by concluding with 
the conviction of the Second Vatican council:  “The Church, therefore, exhorts her sons, that 
through dialogue and collaboration with the followers of other religions, carried out with 
prudence and love and in witness to the Christian faith and life, they recognize, preserve and 
promote the good things, spiritual and moral, as well as the socio-cultural values found among 
these men.”144 
To summarize briefly, the Cultural Linguistic approach to Christianity contends that the 
Biblical narrative framework makes possible a truthful rendering of the one world which we all 
inhabit.  Privileging the Christian tradition is not based on an appeal to universal principles and 
structures but on an ad hoc apologetic coherently explaining and assimilating a contextually 
based shared space.  However, an explanation of how one might understand Christianity to be 
preferred to other religions is not a proposal that Christianity is preferred.   Though, in this 
thesis, I do not intend to defend the claim that Christianity is more preferable, it may be 
legitimate to undertake such a project.   The proposal is that the Cultural Linguistic approach 
allows for a feasible religious preference and apologetics may have a role to play in justifying 
the preferentiality of a specific religion.  
***************************************************************************** 
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Conclusion: 
 
 
Though the last century has presented an increased intensity of encounter with the 
religious other, the conversation about the plurality of religions is one that has lasted 
thousands of years and this thesis enters into only a small portion of that conversation.  The 
purpose of this thesis was to address the question of whether it is legitimate to make an 
apologetic attempt to argue for a specific religious preference and selected Christianity as a 
case study.  By religious preference, I referred to warrantedly preferring a specific confession of 
a traditional religion as true, even in the face of a plurality of different religions.  The preferred 
religion is the one which merits my preference and affirmation in the existential commitment of 
faith. 
The first section introduced what was entailed in a claim of religious preference. A 
religion that is preferable, in the public and objective sense, enables a person to speak, see, and 
act truly; it is a lens and a language for the believer.  The tradition expresses most truly what is, 
explains what is observed in the world, and empowers a person to live in a way aligned with 
that reality.  However, religious preference is not a claim to completely possess absolute truth, 
but to be placed on a path that by following which we are led toward the truth.145  Section One 
then proceeded to offer a defense of religious preference.  After discussing a dualism between 
“public facts” and “private values”146  that pervades pluralist assumptions, prominent moral 
and epistemic objections to religious preference were addressed.  The conclusion was that 
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religious preference is inescapable if one is to take religion seriously.  If religious preference is 
dismissed because its claims are arrogant, ideologically imperialistic, culturally conditioned, 
epistemically arbitrary personal beliefs that may be “true for you but not for everyone,” then 
pluralism should be dismissed because its claims are arrogant, imperialistic, culturally 
conditioned, epistemically arbitrary personal beliefs that may be “true  for you but not for 
everyone.”  Ultimately, religious preference is neither a moral nor epistemic failure, and 
something like it is wholly unavoidable given our human condition.147 One must “run the risk of 
acting as if my passional need of taking the world religiously might be prophetic and right.”148  
Objections aside, the second section proposed that a promising foundation for religious 
preference could be found in Lindbeck’s Cultural Linguistic approach.  In contrast to the 
Cognitive Propositional and Experiential Expressive model, the Cultural Linguistic approach 
views religions as a kind of cultural/linguistic framework or medium that shapes the entirety of 
life and thought and makes possible thoughts, sentiments, and experiences that (if rightly 
utilized) are capable of corresponding to ultimate, universal reality.149  In the way that the 
“language” of mathematics makes possible a description of quantity that could not be if we 
were limited to the language of music or poetry, the preferable religion allows for the 
possibility of an experience that corresponds to the ontological reality.  On the one hand, a 
Cultural Linguistic religious preference is a strong claim to make because it suggests that the 
religious preference is based on categorical accuracy.  On the other hand the religious 
preference is weak in so far as categorical accuracy neither guarantees nor excludes the 
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possibility of propositional truth or error.  The second section ended by transitioning to a 
distinctively Christian Cultural Linguistic religious preference that allows the Christian tradition 
to shape the entirety of life and make possible thoughts, sentiments, and experiences that (if 
rightly utilized) are capable of corresponding to ultimate, universal reality.  Christian doctrines 
become rules of language which make it possible to speak truthfully about God’s revelation of 
himself in Jesus Christ, see the true center of history in the story of the world, and act in 
accordance to God’s will as the sign, agent, and foretaste of his kingdom.150   
The final section applied the Cultural Linguistic model to Christian preference and was 
concerned with the possibility of apologetically justifying the preferentiality of a specific 
religion.  Clooney provided a concrete illustration of the character of a Christian preference in 
accord with the Cultural Linguistic approach.  With regard to apologetically justifying a 
specifically Christian preference, a difficulty arose between the notion of incommensurability 
and the practice of apologetics.  An exploration of ways in which incommensurability and 
apologetics could be reconciled followed.  What emerged was an ad hoc apologetic strategy 
that preferred a religious tradition not on the basis of an appeal to universal principles and 
structures but on coherently explaining and assimilating a contextually based shared space.  
Though, in this thesis, I did not intend to defend the claim that Christianity is more preferable, it 
may be legitimate to undertake such a project.   The proposal is that the Cultural Linguistic 
approach allows for a feasible religious preference and apologetics may have a role to play in 
justifying the preferentiality of a specific religion.  All things considered, I conclude that it is 
warranted to make an apologetic argument for a particular religious preference; which is to say, 
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paraphrasing Chesterton, some dogma and philosophy can be believed on Mondays in the 
twelfth century as well as on Tuesdays in the twenty first.     
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